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The Changing Landscape of Trademark Law in Tinseltown:
From Debbie Does Dallas to The Hangover

Mark Bartholomew and John Tehranian

Hollywood both creates and borrows. This duality simultaneously implicates intellectual
property law and the First Amendment. While movies, television shows, sound recordings, and
video games constitute valuable pieces of intellectual property in and of themselves, they
frequently make use of the intellectual property of others, often without authorization or
payment. Trademarks—legally-protectable symbols used to indicate the source of goods and
distinguish those goods from those sold or made by others—constitute one such of type of
intellectual property. Filmmakers often employ trademarks for expressive purposes to
contextualise their work in the cultural and commercial milieu in which we live. But in the
process of exercising creative judgment by employing the use of trademarks in their works, they
may find themselves subject to legal liability for infringement.
Brand owners have grown increasingly sensitive to the (mis)use of their trademarks in
entertainment content. In 2012, the venerable Hollywood Reporter went so far as to muse about
whether all the Mayan talk of the coming Armageddon was actually referring to (what it billed
as) a Hollywood ‘trademarklawpocalypse.’1 In the span of a few weeks, a series of significant
trademark disputes erupted, putting the entire industry on notice. On the eve of the release of
The Hobbit: An Unexpected Journey (2012), Warner Bros., New Line Cinema, and MGM
successfully enjoined the distributor Global Asylum from releasing its own new film about
hobbits under the name Age of the Hobbits (the film was later released as Clash of the Empires
(2013)). Anheuser-Busch took umbrage at the fact that Denzel’s Washington’s alcoholic pilot in
Flight (2012) used Budweiser as his choice inebriant while drinking and driving. Rizzoli
Publications objected to NBC’s use of ‘Rizzoli’ as the name of comedian Ray Romano’s
character on the series Parenthood (2010- ). And when one of the characters in Woody Allen’s
Midnight in Paris (2011) (mis)quoted author William Faulkner, the Faulkner Estate sued the
film’s distributor Sony Classic Pictures for improperly associating the author with the movie.2
Feuds between trademark holders and filmmakers are nothing new. For example, in
1979, the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders sued a New York cinema for showing the pornographic
film Debbie Does Dallas (1978). They alleged that the film was confusing to moviegoers
because it contained a scene where a character wore a cheerleading uniform strikingly similar to
the blue and white boots, blouses, and vests adorning the sideline representatives of ‘America’s
Team.’3 The court hearing the case held in favour of the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, rejecting
the cinema’s First Amendment defence on the ground that there were other ways to discuss
sexuality and athletics without appropriating the Cheerleaders’ famous trade dress.4
1

In an emblematic sign of the times, intellectual property attorney Charles Colman has actually sought trademark
protection for the term ‘trademarklawpocalypse.’ See TRADEMARKLAWPOCALPYSE Application, United States
Patent and Trademark Office, Serial No. 85765482, filed 28 October 2012 (pending intent-to-use trademark
application).
2
See Faulkner Literary Rights, LLC v. Sony Classic Pictures, Inc., 12CV100-M-A (N.D. Miss., filed 25 October
2012). The suit also included claims for copyright infringement.
3
Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 203 (2d Cir.1979).
4
Id. at 206.

Just a decade later, a decision by the same court regarding the balance between trademark
rights and free speech produced a strikingly different result. When famed Italian director
Federico Fellini produced a movie about two fictional Italian cabaret performers who imitated
Ginger Rogers and Fred Astaire, he titled his movie Ginger and Fred (1986). Screen legend
Ginger Rogers sued for trademark infringement. Just as the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders
alleged unlawful use of their trademarked uniforms, Rogers contended that Fellini had
improperly used her name without permission, thereby creating consumer confusion over her
endorsement of the film.5 Yet in sharp contrast to the Cheerleaders’ case, the court rejected
Rogers’ arguments, instead vindicating the filmmaker’s right to free expression in a crucial,
precedent-setting victory.6 The court announced a new free speech safeguard (subsequently
styled by other courts as ‘the Rogers defence’) for those using trademarks in an artistic fashion.7
Fellini’s fortune forever changed the way courts have approached the balancing of
trademark and free speech rights. In the past two decades, courts have used the Rogers defence
to protect numerous content creators and distributors from liability for unauthorised use of
trademarks in artistic works. In a recent suit, for example, a federal court drew on the Rogers
defence to quickly dismiss claims of trademark infringement and unfair competition brought by
Louis Vuitton against the makers of the blockbuster The Hangover II (2011) for a misleading
reference to its name and famous Toile Monogram in a scene in the film.8
This chapter explores how courts have sought to balance the competing interests at stake
when filmmakers employ brand names and images in their work and brand owners threaten
liability for trademark infringement. Specifically, we use Rogers v. Grimaldi9 as a primary pivot
point to trace the remarkable change in approaches that courts have taken to First Amendment
defences in trademark cases over the past few decades. To this end, we conduct case studies of
two opinions—Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd.10 (decided a decade
before Rogers) and Louis Vuitton v. Warner Bros11 (decided two decades after Rogers)—to
illustrate the increasing recognition of free speech defences to trademark infringement claims
against filmmakers. We also examine what may have precipitated this change and its potential
impact on Hollywood’s future. As we shall also see, the growing First Amendment defences to
trademark liability are not without limits and the case law has not always favoured the First
Amendment rights of content creators over the intellectual property rights of trademark holders.
Even as courts have come to recognise greater protections for creators over the years, the
increased presence of brands in everyday life means that Hollywood’s attempts at verisimilitude
will continue to cause conflicts with the claims of brand owners.
The Legal Landscape Before Rogers
In the United States, trademark law is primarily the preserve of federal law, not the law of
the individual states. In the main, one federal statute—the Lanham Act of 1946—governs the
use of trademarks. Aggrieved trademark holders turn to the statute to seek legal recourse. Over
time, trademark law has expanded well beyond just the protection of words; images, colours,
5

Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 997 (2d Cir. 1989).
Id. at 1005.
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Id. at 1000.
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Louis Vuitton Mallatier S.A. v. Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc., 868 F. Supp. 2d 172 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
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875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989).
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604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979).
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Louis Vuitton, 868 F. Supp. 2d at 172.
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sounds, and even distinctive packaging or the design of the product itself (known by the legal
term of art “trade dress”) can enjoy protection.
When the owner of one of these protectable symbols objects to another’s use of it, the
Lanham Act provides one central ground for legal suit: likelihood of consumer confusion.
Initially, actionable consumer confusion referred to situations where a defendant successfully
passed off its goods as the goods of the mark holder. Over time, however, courts have grown
increasingly generous in recognising confusion, even countenancing scenarios where consumers
only think that the authorised mark holder has somehow sponsored the defendant’s activities or
where any initial consumer confusion is dispelled prior to purchase. Once the mark holder
demonstrates a likelihood of consumer confusion, a court will often issue a legal order halting
the objectionable use. One key exception comes when the defendant invokes a recognised
defence to a claim of trademark infringement. This is where the First Amendment can
sometimes find a starring role within the world of trademark law. There are times when, despite
a likelihood of consumer confusion, the free-speech interests of an unauthorised mark user can
trump the intellectual property rights of the mark holder.
In the decades prior to the Second Circuit’s influential 1989 decision in Rogers v.
Grimaldi, the way in which courts evaluated the trade-off between trademark rights and free
expression in film was inconsistent. Perhaps most prevalent was a legal test that asked whether
‘alternative avenues’ existed for a filmmaker making unauthorised use of someone else’s brand.
Under the test, if no alternative avenues to the mark’s use exist, then the use must be permitted
under the First Amendment. On the other hand, if the filmmaker can make her expressive point
without using the plaintiff’s trademark, then the filmmaker has no free speech defence and can
be held liable for trademark infringement. The test is based on Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,12 a United
States Supreme Court decision outside of trademark law upholding a shopping mall owner’s
decision to prohibit the distribution of handbills opposing the Vietnam War.13 The prohibition
did not violate the First Amendment, the Court reasoned, because the protestors had other
avenues for making their views heard, including distribution of their handbills on the public
streets and sidewalks surrounding the shopping centre.14
Lower courts evaluating free speech defences in trademark infringement cases ran with
the unrelated Tanner decision, declaring that the First Amendment only safeguards the
unauthorised use of trademarks in movies (and other creative endeavours) when the use is so
closely connected to the subject matter of an artistic work that the author has no alternative way
of expressing what the work is about.15 In other words, if the filmmaker has another viable way
to communicate her message, then she must forgo use of the complaining party’s trademark.
Case Study: Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders v. Pussycat Cinema
Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders v. Pussycat Cinema represents the most significant example of a
court applying this ‘alternative avenues’ test. As its heading implies, the suit involved a
combustible combination of two mainstays of modern American popular culture—pornography
and professional athletics. By the late 1970s, the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders were a
nationally known brand. They sold over three quarters of a million posters through 1977-78 and
12

407 U.S. 551 (1972).
Id.
14
Id. at 566-67.
15
Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 398 (8th Cir. 1987); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v.
Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1979).
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seventy million viewers watched them perform at the 1978 Super Bowl.16 The Cheerleaders
vigorously policed unauthorised uses of their brand, particularly when the use came in the
context of adult entertainment. When a group of former cheerleaders appeared in Playboy
magazine in a faux Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders ensemble, and then attempted to resell a photo
from the Playboy shoot as a commercial poster, the Cheerleaders successfully sued for trademark
infringement.17 As Suzanne Mitchell, coordinator for the Cowboys Cheerleaders stated, ‘They
can walk down Main Street, just don’t do it in our uniform.’18
The Cheerleaders’ legal strategy also targeted the pornographic film industry. In 1978,
adult cinemas began to screen the popular pornographic film, Debbie Does Dallas.19 The plot of
the film, which the court in review described as ‘a gross and revolting sex film,’ features a group
of high school cheerleaders trying to travel to Texas for tryouts for the fictional ‘Texas Cowgirls’
cheerleading squad. To raise the necessary travel funds, the cheerleaders turn to prostitution. In
the film’s final scene, the movie’s eponymous star engages in a variety of sexual acts with the
owner of a sporting goods store. She performs these acts in various states of dress (and undress)
while wearing her ‘Texas Cowgirls’ uniform. Debbie’s uniform, with its particular striping,
studding, buckle and colour schemes, bears a striking resemblance to the regalia of the Dallas
Cowboys Cheerleaders.
Objecting to the use of their uniform in this undignified manner, the Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders sued several entities associated with Debbie Does Dallas for trademark
infringement, contending the film-going public would find such use ‘confusing.’ They sought
injunctions to prevent distribution or exhibition of the film. One of the targets of the
Cheerleaders’ litigation was the Pussycat Cinema, an adult theatre located just off Times Square
in New York City. The Pussycat Cinema operated at a time when adult theatres flourished in
New York. 42nd Street, dubbed by Rolling Stone ‘the sleaziest block in America,’ housed 121
adult establishments at the time of the lawsuit.20 In the past, New York theatres like the Pussycat
Cinema had welcomed lawsuits as the increased publicity only served to fuel, rather than
depress, ticket sales.21 But by the late 1970s, politicians were beginning to crack down on Times
Square’s adult establishments. In response to petitions from Times Square businesses, New
York Mayor Abraham Beame created the Midtown Enforcement Project, which began targeting
the theatres, and others trading in adult-themed merchandise, for city inspections and possible
legal action.22 In 1978, when Debbie Does Dallas was released, Mayor Ed Koch continued this
process, pushing existing adult theatres to close their doors or switch over to more ‘legitimate’
fare.23 In addition to initiating legal proceedings, Koch mobilised New York’s elite arts
community, including performing arts and architectural preservation groups, to pressure the
16

Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184, 1186 (5th Cir. 1979); Bill Curry,
‘Something Else to Cheer About in Dallas: The Big Business of Being a Sidelines Star,’ The Washington Post, 17
January 1979, E1.
17
James Ward Lee, ‘Legends In Their Own Time: The Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders,’ in Legendary Ladies of Texas,
ed. Francis Edwards Abernethy (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1994), 198.
18
Curry, E1.
19
Linda Williams, Hard Core: Power, Pleasure, and the “Frenzy of the Visible” (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1999), 170.
20
Gretchen Dykstra, ‘The Times Square Business Improvement District and Its Role in Changing the Face of Times
Square,’ in Sex, Scams, and Street Life: The Sociology of New York City’s Time Square, ed. Robert P. McNamara
(Westport: Praeger, 1995), 78.
21
Peter Bart, Infamous Players: A Tale of Movies, the Mob (and Sex) (New York: Weinstein Books, 2011), 91.
22
William H. Daly, ‘Law Enforcement in Times Square, 1970s-1990s,’ in Sex, Scams, and Street Life,,98.
23
Daly, 99.
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theatres and place Times Square on a more culturally and economically desirable footing. 24
Hence, the Cheerleaders’ lawsuit coincided with a government crackdown on theatres like the
Pussycat Cinema and films like Debbie Does Dallas, thereby providing a painful one-two punch
to Times Square’s besieged adult industry.
It was in this context that a federal court in New York heard the Cheerleaders’ case
against the Pussycat Cinema. The court wasted little time in finding that Debbie Does Dallas
violated the Cheerleaders’ trademark rights. It determined the Cheerleaders’ uniform to be
protectable trade dress. It also agreed with the Cheerleaders that viewers of the pornographic
film would find the similarities between it and the fictional ‘Texas Cowgirls’ uniform worn in
the film to be ‘confusing.’ As a result, the court held the Pussycat Theater liable for trademark
infringement.
Finding themselves legally naked under trademark law, the defendants unsuccessfully
attempted to shroud their case under the banner of the First Amendment by claiming that they
were making a commentary on the nature of ‘sexuality in athletics’ in U.S. society. A successful
appeal to the First Amendment meant that, even if Debbie Does Dallas did violate the
Cheerleaders’ trademark rights, the interests of free speech should still allow its screening.
Applying the alternative avenues test, the court rejected this defence. Barely able to contain its
revulsion towards the theatre owner and the film at issue, the court grudgingly acknowledged
that the film represented ‘speech,’ potentially protected under the First Amendment.
Nevertheless, it found that an injunction barring the cinema from showing the film posed no First
Amendment concerns. Although failing to specify actual alternatives to the white boots, white
shorts, blue blouse, and white star-studded vest and belt employed by both Debbie and the Dallas
Cowboys Cheerleaders, the court maintained that the film could convey its message in another
fashion. It explained that ‘there are numerous ways in which defendants may comment on
sexuality in athletics without infringing plaintiff’s trademark.’25
The court also brushed aside concerns that a judicial bar on the film’s screening
constituted a forbidden ‘prior restraint’ on speech. The judicial doctrine of prior restraint, first
crystallised in the Supreme Court’s 1931 decision in Near v. Minnesota, is a longstanding
guidepost in First Amendment law that requires courts to strongly disfavour any kind of judicial
or administrative order that prohibits speech being made in advance of its publication. Normally,
the doctrine presumes that any attempt to block use of a communicative forum before actual
expression has taken place is unconstitutional; instead, to further society’s interest in free
communication, courts typically allow the expression to occur and leave potential plaintiffs to
seek relief, through monetary damages, after the fact.26 Yet the court contended that because
trademark law is ‘content-neutral’ and enforced by private parties, not the government itself, the
prior restraint doctrine was not at issue.27
The Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders case illustrates just how narrow free speech protection
for creative actors accused of trademark infringement was before 1989.28 The court’s
24

Lynne B. Sagalyn, Times Square Roulette: Remaking The City Icon (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001), 172.
Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, 604 F.2d at 206.
26
See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 706 (1931) (deeming that prior restraints are presumptively invalid and
heavily disfavoured under First Amendment analysis).
27
Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, 604 F.2d at 206.
28
It is worth noting that 1989 is not a bright-line date. There were philosophically similar decisions prior to Rogers,
such as the L.L. Bean case decided two years earlier. In L.L. Bean, the court rejected trademark dilution claims
brought by the outdoor catalogue giant against an adult magazine for its unauthorised use of the L.L. Bean mark in a
ribald mock-catalogue. See L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 1987) (‘‘It offends
25
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willingness to discard typical First Amendment concerns over prior restraints on speech stands in
marked contrast to other free speech analyses where attempts to pre-emptively enjoin expression
have been denied even when those expressions have been deemed libellous, obscene, or
threatening to national security.29 Moreover, under the alternative avenues test, the First
Amendment only comes into play when the mark at issue is so intimately related to the work’s
subject matter that the author has no other possible means of explaining what their work is about.
It is almost always possible to conceptualise the author’s creative interest in some way such that
other means of expressing that interest are available. In the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders case,
the court broadly characterised the filmmaker’s expressive point as a commentary on sexuality in
athletics. Yet an equally apt characterisation of the filmmaker’s project might have been as a
commentary on the sexuality of the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders themselves. Even in 1979, the
Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders were known for being far different from other cheerleading units.
With their signature low-cut vests and provocative dance routines akin to Las Vegas burlesque,
they were the first professional squad to make the connection between cheerleading and
sexuality so explicit.30 Under such a characterisation, the filmmaker might have had little
alternative to using the Cheerleaders’ protected trade dress and been inoculated from suit under
the First Amendment. The court’s decision to describe Debbie Does Dallas in the particular
manner it chose demonstrates the tremendous potential for judicial censorship under the
alternative avenues test. In other cases, courts used the same test to reject the First Amendment
claims of filmmakers and block their chosen means of expression. For example, Edgar Rice
Burroughs filed a trademark infringement suit to stop exhibition of an X-rated film titled Tarz &
Jane & Boy & Cheeta (1975)31 and American Dairy Queen Corporation used trademark law to
force a studio to abandon the title ‘Dairy Queens’ for its film about a Minnesota beauty
pageant.32
By limiting protectable speech interests to only those situations in which use of the
trademark is absolutely necessary to the author’s expressive project, the ‘alternative avenues’ test
stands in marked contrast to other areas of First Amendment law. In other contexts, American
law rejects such a cramped view of free speech, preferring not to second-guess a speaker’s
chosen vernacular and to allow greater breathing space for expressive activities. For example, in
Cohen v. California, the Supreme Court recognised that the use of certain words, rather than
their synonyms, is fundamental to the exercise of First Amendment rights. The Court overturned
the conviction of Paul Robert Cohen for disturbing the peace when he walked into a California
courtroom wearing a jacket emblazoned with the words ‘Fuck the Draft.’33 Responding to the
government’s argument that Cohen should have expressed his anti-draft sentiments in more
polite terms, the Court explained: ‘[W]e cannot indulge in the facile assumption that one can
forbid particular words without also running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the
the Constitution . . . to invoke the [Maine] anti-dilution statute as a basis for enjoining the noncommercial use of a
trademark by a defendant engaged in a protected form of expression.’’). That said, no case providing First
Amendment defences for content creators facing claims of trademark infringement has had the widespread impact of
Rogers.
29
Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE
L.J. 147, 210 (1998).
30
Pamela J. Bettis & Natalie Guice Adams, ‘Short Skirts and Breast Juts: Cheerleading, Eroticism, and Schools,’
Sex Education: Sexuality, Society, and Learning 6 no. 2 (2006): 121, 123.
31
Edgar Rice Burroughs, Inc. v. Manns Theatres, 195 U.S.P.Q. 159 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
32
Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prods., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727, 734 (D. Minn. 1998).
33
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16-17 (1971).
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process.’34 Yet, prior to 1989, under the ‘alternative avenues’ test, courts did forbid the use of
particular words and images by moviemakers and associated entities when those words and
images symbolised a particular business or product.
Not every court of the time embraced the ‘alternative avenues’ test. Some assessed the
claims of trademark owners against filmmakers under what can best be described as an ad hoc
balancing approach. This method involves determining whether consumer confusion is likely—
as noted earlier, the sine qua non for any successful trademark infringement claim—but with a
simultaneous eye towards the defendant’s interest in free speech. For example, once a court
identifies the defendant’s work as a successful parody, an important means of expressing
criticism and commentary, it may discount evidence traditionally offered to show consumer
confusion, like the degree of similarity between the plaintiff’s trademark and the mark used by
the defendant. The problem with the ad hoc balancing approach is that it offers little predictive
comfort to content creators accused of infringement. Just because a court determined that, on
balance, there is little likelihood of confusion from an expressive work in one case, it is hard to
know how such a context-specific analysis should translate to the next case. For example, when
a lower court determined that consumers were unlikely to confuse Walt Disney Productions’ use
of the name ‘Tron’ for a 1982 science-fiction film with the electric fuses trademarked under the
same name, a higher court reversed, contending that the lower court had been overly charitable
to Disney in how it interpreted the evidence of consumer confusion.35 Whether ad hoc balancing
or the alternative avenues test was used, Hollywood studios and other content producers faced an
uncertain and often restrictive legal landscape when it came to using brand names and images in
their works.
Rogers and the Artistic-Relevance Standard
If filmmakers utilising brand imagery had to tread on hostile and uncertain ground in the
1970s and 1980s, the legal terrain dramatically shifted in their favour at the decade’s end. As we
have seen, up until then, courts charged with balancing the rights of filmmakers with those of
trademark holders often chose the latter, and jettisoned some time-honored First Amendment
protections in the process. This trend began to change, however, in 1989 with the decision in the
case of Rogers v. Grimaldi. Even though the Second Circuit for the United States Court of
Appeals—the same court that decided the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders case—issued the ruling,
the results were diametrically different. In fact, the Rogers decision expressly repudiated the
alternative avenues test and ushered in a new, more filmmaker-friendly approach towards the
balancing of free speech and trademark rights.
The case started when famed Italian director Federico Fellini made a movie about two
fictional Italian cabaret performers who imitated Ginger Rogers and Fred Astaire. Fellini titled
his movie, his third to last film, Ginger and Fred. Reviewers praised Fellini’s work, which
premiered in Rome in 1986.36 Ginger and Fred has been described as a ‘hyperfilm,’ as the film
serves as both a fictional narrative and an autobiographical exploration of the great director and
his filmography. Frequent Fellini collaborator Marcello Mastroianni played the role of ‘Fred,’
who serves as Fellini’s surrogate in the film. Meanwhile, Giulietta Masina, Fellini’s real life

34

Id. at 26.
McGraw-Edison Co. v. Walter Disney Prods., 787 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1986).
36
Hollis Alpert, Fellini: A Life (New York: Atheneum, 1986), 298.
35
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wife, played the role of ‘Ginger.’37 Although not all critics were so kind, Vincent Canby of The
New York Times placed the film favourably within the Fellini canon, remarking that the film
looked and sounded ‘like the work of no other director.’38
Actress and dancer Rogers did not view Ginger and Fred so favourably, however. Her
longtime co-star Astaire had died in the beginning of 1986. After months of silence, Rogers
issued a statement after the release of Fellini’s film. She proclaimed the film ‘offensive to her
reputation and personality,’ and presumably to her former co-star’s as well.39 She also initiated
an $8 million lawsuit against Alberto Grimaldi and MGM, the motion picture’s producer and
distributor, for false endorsement under trademark law. Shortly thereafter, when asked by the
press about Rogers’ lawsuit on NBC’s Today Show (1952- ), Fellini wryly commented ‘perhaps
she has not seen the film . . . or has been misinformed.’40 But the lawsuit was more than a minor
irritant for the director. Originally scheduled to present the Oscar for Best Picture, alongside
famed directors Akira Kurosawa and Billy Wilder, at the 1986 Academy Awards, Fellini
declined to travel to Hollywood after the lawsuit was filed, instead allowing John Huston to take
his place.41
In her lawsuit, Rogers contended that Fellini had improperly used her name without
permission, thereby creating consumer confusion over her endorsement of the work. Rogers’
permission would definitely have added symbolic and economic capital to the film. Rogers is
listed at #14 on the American Film Institute’s list of the greatest female screen legends in film
history and previously lent her name to a line of lingerie sold by J.C. Penney. The court
remarked that she is ‘among that small elite of the entertainment world whose identities are
readily called to mind by just their first names.’ Nevertheless, Grimaldi and MGM countered
that enforcement of Rogers’ alleged trademark interest in her name would trample their First
Amendment rights by restricting freedom of expression in the production of a creative work.
In the end, Grimaldi and MGM won a seminal victory, reducing the scope of trademark
law and strengthening First Amendment protections for artists. The court announced that it was
discarding the alternative avenues test—a test that the Fellini film would have clearly failed.42 It
explained that, while the test might have been appropriate in its original application involving
claims against landowners, it was not a good match for trademark law. Unlike a landowner’s
decision to prevent certain speech in a physical location, a trademark owner’s infringement suit
not only the influences the speech’s location but also its actual content.43 The typical result in a
trademark case is an injunction completely stopping the defendant from using the mark at issue.
Given the ability of a successful trademark infringement lawsuit to remove particular speech
from the marketplace of ideas entirely, the court concluded that the alternative avenues test was
too restrictive and had to be replaced with another mechanism better suited to balancing free
expression with trademark rights.44

37

Millicent Marcus, After Fellini: National Cinema in the Postmodern Age (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
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39
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40
Alpert, 300.
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The court’s solution was a new test—one that was more solicitous of artistic choice and,
hence, more friendly to Hollywood filmmakers. Instead of simply asking whether the filmmaker
could have made her point in an alternative fashion, the court announced a new sort of enquiry:
whether ‘the title has no artistic relevance to the underlying work whatsoever, or, if it has some
artistic relevance, [whether] the title explicitly misleads as to the source or the content of the
work.’45 A title satisfying both the ‘some artistic relevance’ and not explicitly misleading
criteria receives First Amendment immunity from a trademark infringement action.
The court easily concluded that Fellini’s film met both of the newly announced criteria.
First, the title was artistically relevant to the underlying film. The court described this
requirement as merely requiring a ‘minimum threshold of artistic relevance to the film’s
content.’46 The film’s main characters were named ‘Ginger’ and ‘Fred.’ Moreover, these names
were not arbitrarily chosen to capitalise on the fame of Ginger Rogers and Fred Astaire. Rather,
they were selected because the two main characters made their living imitating the famous
Rogers and Astaire duo. As a result, the names had the requisite amount of artistic relevance.
The court spent more time on the second criterion. Rogers maintained that the film’s title
was explicitly misleading. She offered a survey of likely moviegoers, fourteen per cent of
which, when presented with an advertisement featuring the film’s title, seemed to believe that
Rogers was involved with the making of the Ginger and Fred film.47 She also made the
argument that the film’s title misled consumers not just as to her involvement, but also as to its
subject, by causing them to believe that the film was about her and Fred Astaire in a direct,
biographical sense.48
The court, however, concluded that the risk of some consumer confusion was tolerable in
order to protect interests in artistic expression.49 As a result, it was willing to ignore the survey
data showing that fourteen per cent of the consuming public would be confused as to Rogers’
involvement with Fellini’s project.50 In addition, the court emphasised that the ‘Ginger and
Fred’ title was susceptible to multiple interpretations and, as a result, it could not be described as
explicitly misleading.51 It was true, the court admitted, that those who thought the title referred
to a true biography of the real-life singing duo were being fooled. But the court also noted that
the title has ‘an ironic meaning’ that was equally valid.52 It credited an affidavit from Fellini
himself, which explained that he selected Rogers and Astaire as ‘a glamorous and care-free
symbol of what American cinema represented during the harsh times which Italy experienced in
the 1930s and 1940s.’53 Rather than being misleading, the title, argued the court, ‘is an integral
element of the film and the filmmaker’s artistic expressions.’54 Because the title was artistically
relevant to the film and not explicitly misleading, Grimaldi and MGM’s First Amendment
defence succeeded and Rogers’ complaint was dismissed.
The Rogers decision has proved influential and expansive. Over the past two decades,
several other federal courts have adopted the Rogers test. The test soon grew to encompass not
45
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just movie titles, but trademark claims against works of artistic expression, including claims
where the challenged trademark use occurs in the body of the work. For example, when the
video game Grand Theft Auto borrowed from the trademark and trade dress of a Los Angeles
strip club to depict a Los Angeles-like city, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that
the uses were immunised under the Rogers test.55
Courts have also construed Rogers’ two prongs broadly. One might worry that an openended judicial enquiry into ‘artistic relevance’ could shortchange the expressive interests of
content creators. It would seem that the judges deciding the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders case
would be loathe to credit any artistic design to the creators of Debbie Does Dallas. A similar
response might result when asked to apply Rogers to other seemingly unsavoury or transgressive
works. Giving the benefit of the doubt to Fellini’s artistic vision is one thing; giving this benefit
to filmmakers not legitimated by the cultural elite is another.
Yet in deciphering artistic relevance, courts have generally given great deference to the
vision of defendants. As the court in the Grand Theft Auto case characterised it, ‘the level of
relevance merely must be above zero.’56 Even if the connection between the trademark use and
underlying work’s communicative goal is ‘tenuous,’ the artistic relevance standard is still
satisfied.57 Hence, it is extremely rare for this criterion not to be satisfied. In fact, after Rogers,
courts have recognised the First Amendment interests of pornographic filmmakers as well as the
makers of notoriously violent video games and dismissed the trademark lawsuits against them—
a far cry from the approach of the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders court, which appeared to factor
the supposedly ‘gross and revolting’ nature of the allegedly infringing work against the
defendants when weighing the merits of the plaintiff’s claims.58 It may have taken the artistic
patina of someone like Fellini to dislodge the ‘alternative avenues’ test, but once dislodged,
courts have looked favourably upon the expressive rights of a host of creative entities, not just
those of highbrow directors.
Under Rogers, once it has ascertained the mark’s artistic relevance, a court proceeds to
consideration of whether the defendant’s use was explicitly misleading. Again, the courts have
construed this criterion in a speech-friendly fashion. In any trademark infringement lawsuit, the
trademark holder bears the burden of demonstrating a likelihood of consumer confusion from the
defendant’s use. Courts have been careful to require something over and above this proof of
likely consumer confusion when the Rogers test is called into play. The Second Circuit and
other courts mandate the evidence of confusion be ‘particularly compelling’ to invalidate a
Rogers defence.59 Other courts replace the likelihood of confusion analysis entirely, trading it
for one more tilted in the defendant’s favour. In fact, it seems that once courts determine that the
trademark is being used in an artistic manner, they are more than willing to jettison the
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notoriously unpredictable likelihood of confusion analysis for their own ‘common sense’
analysis, which is geared towards allowing the challenged uses.60
Of course, the broad protections granted by Rogers raise the question as to why, when it
comes to unauthorised use of trademarks, courts have moved in the direction of greater artistic
latitude for filmmakers and other content creators over the past two decades. Part of the reason
might have to do with simply getting used to the notion of movies as speech. Works of
entertainment did not qualify as speech under the First Amendment until 1952. Not unrelatedly,
until recently, defendants in trademark disputes rarely asserted a First Amendment defence.61 It
has taken some time for courts and litigants to explicitly wrestle with the balancing of expressive
interests in film with the perhaps more established rights of trademark holders.
Notably, during the same period, not every legal regime has moved in the direction of
greater creative authority for content creators. Copyright law can often be invoked to restrict the
activities of filmmakers, even when the filmmaker’s activities touch on expression most would
deem at the core of the First Amendment. For example, when conservative politician Charles
‘Chuck’ Devore produced two music videos, ‘The Hope of November’ and ‘All She Wants to Do
is Tax,’ for campaign advertisements that meant to skewer Barbara Boxer—his liberal opponent
for California’s seat in the United States Senate—and to riff on musician Don Henley’s 1980s
megahits ‘The Boys of Summer’ and ‘All She Wants to Do is Dance,’ Henley invoked copyright
law to force the videos’ removal from YouTube. Notably, the court held in DeVore’s favour on
a related trademark infringement claim, but granted judgment for Henley on the copyright
claims. DeVore attempted to make a First Amendment argument to justify his unauthorised use
of Henley’s songs under copyright’s ‘fair use’ defence, but to no avail, even though his allegedly
infringing songs constituted core political speech made during the heat of an electoral
campaign.62
This points to another possible reason for the courts’ increasing reluctance to stifle
filmmakers’ use of trademarked materials. Unlike copyright law, which is principally guided by
the language of a comprehensive federal statutory regime, trademark law relies heavily on judgemade tests and standards. Although a federal statute does provide some grounding for trademark
law, legislatures have encouraged courts to develop the ‘common law’ of trademarks on their
own initiative. This gives judges deciding trademark cases more freedom to manoeuvre than if
they were simply applying statutory language. With courts operating under the assumption that
copyright’s statutory provisions effectively address free speech concerns and foreclose additional
judicial innovations in this area, copyright cases rarely invoke the First Amendment; by contrast,
trademark cases do at times expressly weigh free speech interests. Trademark law’s common
law tradition permits judges to conceptualise the law at a high level of abstraction, allowing for
more judicial discretion when it comes to balancing trademark holder property rights with the
free speech interests of those accused of infringement. The Rogers test elucidates this common
law innovation, as it was a test that not only rejected a prior test deemed insufficiently solicitous
of speech interests, but it also was created by a group of judges completely on their own
initiative with no applicable statutory language to restrict their innovation.
60
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Balancing Trademark Protection and First Amendment Rights in the Post-Rogers World
Over time, the Rogers test has expanded to provide potential cover for all uses of
trademarks in artistic works, not just uses in titles. In addition, courts have generally interpreted
its two prongs in an increasingly speech-protective fashion. As a result, the legal system has
given filmmakers greater expressive latitude in their unauthorised use of household brands. But
this discretion is not without bounds. Trademark holders are still, at times, able to flex their legal
muscles in a way that has consequences for Hollywood content. Judicial interpretation of the
Rogers test continues to evolve, leading to exploitable legal grey areas for owners of famous
brand names.
Case Study: Louis Vuitton v. Warner Bros.
The results of the recent Louis Vuitton suit against the makers of The Hangover II
illustrate the strong protection that filmmakers have typically enjoyed under the Rogers test. As
one of Hollywood’s most successful comedy franchises, The Hangover trilogy grossed more
than a billion dollars for Warner Bros. and its partners. But the wild profit party thrown by the
movie franchise was not without its own litigation hangover, as the trilogy spawned its own
cottage industry of intellectual property suits. Perhaps most famously, the artist who created
Mike Tyson’s Maori-inspired facial tattoo took Warner Bros. to court for its failure to license
rights to the marking when one of the characters in the movie ended up, after a night of
debauchery, with a look-alike rendition emblazoned on his visage.63 The case settled shortly
thereafter on confidential terms.64 By contrast, the other intellectual property dispute related to
the movie touched directly on claims of trademark infringement and unfair competition for the
unauthorised use of a famous mark in the course of the movie.
In the suit,65 luxury handbag manufacturer Louis Vuitton sued Warner Bros. for
misidentifying a knock-off item featuring their most celebrated and iconic design, the so-called
Toile Monogram, in the movie. In an early scene, The Hangover’s fearless protagonists make
their way through Los Angeles International Airport en route to Thailand, where, of course,
hilarity and hijinks ensue. Alan, played by Zach Galifianakis, carries what appears to be an
over-the-shoulder Louis Vuitton ‘Keepall.’ When the group arrives at the gate, Alan sets the bag
on a chair. As Stu, played by Ed Helms, moves the bag to make room for one of their pals to sit,
Alan vociferously objects: ‘Careful that is . . . that is a Lewis Vuitton,’ he exhorts. In fact, the
bag in question was neither a Louis Vuitton nor a ‘Lewis Vuitton,’ but, rather, a notorious Louis
Vuitton knock-off made by copycat manufacturer Diophy, a company that had sold its less
expensive versions of faux Louis Vuitton merchandise throughout the United States.
Consequently, the real Louis Vuitton was thoroughly unamused and a civil action resulted.
Interestingly, in the course of litigation, Louis Vuitton strategically limited its claims. It
did not assert that Warner Bros.’ use deceived the public into thinking that Louis Vuitton
sponsored or was affiliated with the movie. Rather, Louis Vuitton believed that the scene in
63
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question infringed its marks by mischaracterising the Diophy bag as an authentic Louis Vuitton
bag. According to Louis Vuitton, Warner Bros.’ misrepresentation created a likelihood of
confusion in the minds of the consuming public and thereby injured the Louis Vuitton brand by
conflating it with an inferior product. In response to the allegations, Warner Bros. moved to
dismiss the suit on the basis of the Rogers defence.
The court hearing the case took a broad and favourable view of the defence. On the first
element of the Rogers test, the decision provided a generous reading of artistic relevance, noting
that the standard is ‘purposely low’ and satisfied unless the use has no artistic relevance
‘whatsoever.’66 This threshold was clearly met with Alan’s ironic use of the Diophy bag and
mispronunciation of ‘Louis’ while grousing at the mistreatment of his purported luxury good.
On the second element of the Rogers test, the court found that the use did not ‘explicitly
mislead[] as to the source or the content of the work.’ As such, the Rogers defence immunised
the filmmakers from liability. Importantly, the court rejected Louis Vuitton’s argument that the
‘explicitly misleading’ test should include consumer confusion about the source or content of a
third party’s goods (here, the Diophy bag). Prior cases limited the ‘explicitly misleading’ test to
confusion as to whether the defendant’s work was sponsored by the plaintiff-rightsholder. To
support its argument for a more expansive view of ‘explicitly misleading,’ Louis Vuitton drew
on the object of this essay’s first case study—the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders case.67
Significantly, the court expressly contrasted Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders to Rogers and
rejected the viability of the former in favour of the latter. First, the court noted that the former
case’s approach to First Amendment defences to trademark claims had been properly criticised
by a number of courts and observers and had been effectively replaced with the latter case’s
approach in matters involving artistic works.68 Second, the court noted that even the Dallas
Cowboys Cheerleaders case did not allow the type of broad application of the Lanham Act being
advocated by Louis Vuitton in its suit against Warner Bros. Specifically, Louis Vuitton claimed
liability based on consumer confusion that ‘the Diophy bag is really a genuine Louis Vuitton
bag; and . . . that Louis Vuitton approved the use of the Diophy bag in the [f]ilm.’69 However,
neither type of confusion described by Louis Vuitton spoke to the actionable theory approved by
Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders—that the film itself (rather than a product within it) was
sponsored or approved by the trademark holder. In so doing, the court furthered the emerging,
Rogers-inspired view disfavouring Lanham Act claims that attack content within artistic works.
As the court held, any such claims must be read narrowly and must demonstrate forms of
consumer confusion that are 'particularly compelling.’70
It is also worth noting that the Louis Vuitton court even decided the issue on a motion to
dismiss, prior to the initiation of discovery and despite Vuitton’s insistence that it should have
the right to determine, among other things, whether Warner Bros. meant to use a Diophy bag or
not. The early adjudication of trademark claims involving artistic works bodes well for the
66
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expressive rights of filmmakers, especially those who may not be well-financed or supported by
the major studios. The threat of litigation can have a chilling effect on expressive uses of
trademarks, even when the claims advanced by a rightsholder have little or no merit. Given the
high costs of litigation, especially for infringement suits in federal court, many creators have
eschewed uses of anyone else’s intellectual property for fear of the hassle and expense of
defence. Furthermore, claims of infringement can attach liability to downstream distributors and
exhibitors, thereby creating a cloud on title and making release of a film difficult. The Louis
Vuitton case adds to an emerging body of case law that expressly affirms courts’ option to
quickly dispense with claims stemming from the unauthorised use of trademarks in artistic
works.
Finally, the Louis Vuitton court immunised the defendants from additional unfair
competition and New York state law dilution claims. It reasoned that the same First Amendment
considerations (i.e., those embodied in the Rogers test) that immunised Warner Bros. from
liability under the Lanham Act provided a safe harbour for Warner Bros. from these common
law and state law claims as well.71 Thus, the Rogers test’s First Amendment moorings allow it
to grant broad protection for liability flowing from unauthorised trademark uses in artistic
content.
The Limits of Rogers
Despite the Louis Vuitton case and other recent successes for content creators warding off
legal claims pertaining to unauthorised use of trademarks in artistic works, Rogers’ influence
should not be overstated. Although implemented by most courts that have considered it, at least
one federal circuit court (the Third Circuit) has repeatedly expressed scepticism, contending that
Rogers immunises too many unauthorised trademark uses.72 Moreover, even in jurisdictions that
have adopted the Rogers test, there continue to be restrictions on filmmakers’ activities. The
Ninth Circuit has expressly adopted Rogers, for example,73 yet that fact did not stop a court in
the Central District of California from issuing an injunction in 2012 against the release of the
aforementioned ‘mockbuster’ Clash of the Empires in advance of the summer release of the New
Line Cinema blockbuster The Hobbit: An Unexpected Journey.74
In the case, Warner Bros. Entertainment v. The Global Asylum, Inc.,75 the court found
that the defendants ran badly afoul of the Rogers safe harbour due to several factors.
Specifically, based on its reading of the language of relevant Ninth Circuit precedent, the Global
Asylum court divined and identified two implicit limitations on the Rogers defence that applied
in the case.76 First, the court supplanted the previously lax standard for meeting artistic
71
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relevance by holding that a usage is, per se, not artistically relevant if the defendant ‘merely
borrow[s] another’s property to get attention.’77 The imposition of this additional requirement
fundamentally narrows the defence and moves it far from the deferential version applied by the
actual Rogers court and such decisions as Louis Vuitton—cases where courts held that the
threshold for artistic relevance was ‘purposefully low’ and was met unless a use of a mark had
no artistic relevance ‘whatsoever.’78
Second, the Global Asylum court held that any excusable artistic use must be related to
the original mark itself.79 As the court reasoned, every case in the Rogers universe to date had
involved use of a mark that was related to the original mark itself, whether it was Fellini
referring to Ginger to evoke the spirit of Ginger Rogers or Rockstar Games drawing on the name
of a real Los Angeles strip club in order to heighten the realism of their Grand Theft Auto game
which is set in the fictional, but L.A.-influenced, city of San Andreas.80 Since the defendants in
Global Asylum had expressly disclaimed any link between their use of the term ‘Hobbit’ and
Tolkien’s Hobbits, the court held that the defendants had effectively waived their claim of
artistic relevance.81
Of course, with such an analysis, the Global Asylum court threatens to put defendants in a
troubling Catch-22. After all, a defendant will frequently claim that their use of an allegedly
infringing term had an unrelated genesis and was not drawn from the allegedly infringed term.
Such a tactic is used to avoid a finding of bad faith in the likelihood-of-confusion analysis that
courts must conduct when determining if the plaintiff has made a prima facie case under the
Lanham Act and if the use is explicitly misleading and therefore ineligible for the Rogers safe
harbour. Moreover, contrary to its holding on the artistic relevance issue, the court actually
found that the defendants were trying to refer to Tolkein’s Hobbits in several other parts of the
decision in areas where such an attempt would factor against the defendants, rather than for
them. Indeed, the court made much ado about the fact that, rather than just using the word
‘Hobbit’ in their title, the defendants also mimicked the distinctive gold, stylised and capitalised
font of the plaintiff when they made use of the term ‘Hobbit,’ thereby making the association
with the Plaintiff even more explicit. The court also noted that media coverage of The Age of
Hobbits described the work as a ‘reimagined version of J.R.R. Tolkien's mythical universe’ and
‘a fantasy tale inspired by J.R.R. Tolkien's The Lord of the Rings.’82 With these facts in mind,
the court held that the defendants’ use was explicitly misleading and therefore not subject to the
Rogers defence, even if it had been artistically relevant in the first place. All told, the Global
Asylum decision exemplifies the types of restrictions that courts may place on the Rogers
defence—limitations that can effectively neutralise the defence despite its de jure availability.
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At the same time, the Rogers test continues to evolve and, over time, could change in a
manner that is not as protective of artistic expression. One court tried to limit Rogers’
application by requiring a defendant asserting the defence to prove that the mark at issue is ‘of
such cultural significance that it has become an integral part of the public’s vocabulary.’83
Although other courts have declined this invitation to effectively limit the protections of Rogers
to only uses of truly iconic brand names,84 this example reveals the flexible nature of common
law decision-making in this area and raises the concern that the free speech protections now
available to filmmakers may disappear in the future.
A more significant limitation on Rogers is that it only applies to non-commercial speech.
According to some courts, once a work is deemed ‘commercial,’ a court is no longer obligated to
address a Rogers defence or any other First Amendment appeal.85 Such a rule has profound
consequences on the availability of the Rogers defence. Determining where the boundary
between commercial and non-commercial speech falls is a task riddled with uncertainty. Those
making movies can take comfort in various decisions holding that films, music videos, video
games, and books all constitute forms of non-commercial speech, even when they are obviously
produced and sold to realise a profit. That said, this position is not black letter law—at least not
yet. Several cases have contributed to the uncertain legal landscape by labelling the
entertainment industry’s unauthorized use of third-party intellectual property in titles or content
as ‘commercial’ in certain contexts from which it is difficult to divine a coherent rule.86 For
example, use of the ‘Dairy Queen’ trademark in the title of the film Dairy Queens about fictional
beauty pageants in the Midwest was deemed ‘commercial’ by the court review and, therefore,
ineligible for any First Amendment solicitude. As a result, New Line Cinema was forced to
change the film’s title to Drop Dead Gorgeous prior to its release in 1999. Similarly, the use of
Dr. Seuss’ trademarks and copyrights in a book about the O.J. Simpson trial written in the style
of ‘The Cat in the Hat’ was deemed ‘commercial,’ thereby strengthening infringement claims
that resulted in the issuance of an injunction against the book’s publication and distribution.87
Furthermore, the distinction between commercial and non-commercial speech as applied
to film may become more difficult to make as studios increasingly turn to product placement and
merchandising tie-ins to maximise revenue. At some point, a motion picture crosses the line
from ‘film’ to ‘advertisement.’ At that point, courts appear willing to let First Amendment
interests recede. On this front, the decision Facenda v. N.F.L. Films88 is instructive in that it
expressly denied a Rogers defence for the National Football League when it used, without
authorization, the voice of legendary sports announcer John Facenda in its twenty-two minute
film The Making of Madden NFL 06.89 Facenda is, of course, the legendary ‘Voice of God’ from
NFL Films fame. Shortly before his death, Facenda had provided the NFL with a broad release
allowing them to exploit his audio recordings in any way, so long as the use not ‘constitute an
endorsement or sponsorship of any product or service.’90 Facenda’s estate raised a trademark
claim for false endorsement, contending that fans hearing his voice on the film would assume
83
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that he had lent his approval to the film and the video game it was describing, Madden NFL
(1988- ). The NFL maintained that its periodic use of Facenda’s voice represented an artistic
choice for a documentary film, not an effort to confuse consumers as to endorsement or
sponsorship.91 The court rejected this argument, explaining that the NFL’s ‘economic
motivation’ rendered the film commercial speech.92 Because no one in the film had anything
negative to say about the video game (i.e., in the style of a hagiography, it served as an
unabashed celebration of the work and its making), the court did not believe the film had a
‘documentary purpose,’93 and, in the end, concluded it was only meant to serve as an
advertisement for the Madden video game.94 As a result, the promotional use was commercial
and the NFL could not take advantage of the Rogers defence.95
The Facenda case also flags two other potentially noteworthy limitations to the Rogers
defence. First, Facenda casts some doubt about the extension of Rogers to protect trademark
uses in artistic content, rather than just artistic titling. Although the Facenda court admitted that
the Rogers test had been expressly adopted by four circuits,96 it took pains to point out that only
two circuit court decisions had actually applied the test to immunise anything more than the title
of an artistic work.97 And, in one of those decisions, a dissenting opinion refused to apply
Rogers precisely because it was being extended from its original scope (titles) to a broader
application (content).98 Admittedly, since Facenda, that number has increased.99 Yet Facenda
is correct that the vast majority of Rogers-related cases—like the Rogers case itself—have
involved the use of trademarks in titles rather than in the underlying content itself.100 The
continued expansion of Rogers to cover underlying content therefore remains probable but
nevertheless uncertain.
Second, and more broadly, Facenda demonstrates that the Rogers test itself has not (yet?)
earned acceptance across all U.S. courts. The Facenda decision acknowledged that the defence
had been adopted, at the time, by four federal circuit courts (including the influential Second and
Ninth Circuits).101 Yet that fact did not prevent the Third Circuit from expressing scepticism
91
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See, e.g., E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F. 3d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir. 2008).
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about the defence and declining to adopt it in the case presented.102 Given the reality of national
(if not international) distribution of entertainment content and the risks of favourable forum
shopping by trademark-holding plaintiffs, the absence of universal adoption of the Rogers
defence can create the spectre of liability in less protective jurisdictions and can implicate
content decisions by creators and distributors of film.
Conclusion
Over the past quarter century, the legal approach to balancing trademark rights with
freedom of artistic expression has undergone a seismic shift. Films are now considered forms of
art fully within the scope of First Amendment protection and courts have adopted a mechanism
for reconciling the property interests of trademark holders with the expressive interests of
filmmakers (and other creative actors) in a way that often tilts in the latter’s favour. Fellini’s
film enjoyed only a middling critical reception, but it ushered in a new legal paradigm for those
who use trademarks to create new expression. It is important to recognise, however, that not
everyone whom this filmmaker-friendly trend in the law is meant to protect can effectively
harness it. Major studios with significant resources can take advantage of the Rogers test and
subsequent generous judicial glosses on its ‘artistically relevant’ and ‘explicitly misleading’
terms. But smaller filmmakers may feel the need to capitulate to the claims of trademark holders
rather than investing in expensive and uncertain legal proceedings. In addition, changes to the
film industry, including greater product placement and an increased focus on building and
monetising ‘brands’ spawned by successful movie franchises, threaten the vitality of the current
balance between filmmaking and trademark law. As the line between cinematic artistry and
advertising continues to dissolve and business models and incentives continue to change, the law
in this area will not stand still. Just like future filmmakers, future courts will need to innovate.

Id. at 1018 (‘Because we hold that “The Making of Madden NFL 06” is commercial speech rather than artistic
expression, we need not reach the issue whether our Court will adopt the Rogers test. We acknowledge that
commercial speech does receive some First Amendment protection. . . . Yet the Lanham Act customarily avoids
violating the First Amendment, in part by enforcing a trademark only when consumers are likely to be misled or
confused by the alleged infringer’s use.’) (internal citations omitted).
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